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University of Idaho
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ABSTRACT
Crime control thro11gh lmr enforcement is generally considered to be a two-part process of appre
hending and incapacitating or rehabilitating the gLtilty, and deterring the innocent from crime by the
ihreat of punishment. The analysis presented here slwws that the protection of the innocent from harass
ment-detention, arresr. p11nishment, and other inrrusions by the criminal justice system-is important
in deterring crime. Spec(fically, the analysis shoH·s that deterrence from crime is weakened and then lost
/or a rational indii·idual ,,·ho holds the majority arritude roward risk, if the levels of rightful punishment
and -..,,1-rongfLtl harassmem are increased, as in a war 011 crime, and the likelihoods of wrongful and right
ful pLtnishment are reasonably close. The analysis is employed ro show how the perceived likelihood of
harassment may be a comributing factor to the disproponionarely high representation of minoriry
groups in the U.S. prison system. © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd

INTRODl7CTION
This article establishes that, under certain
conditions, individuals are encouraged to com
mit crimes by a belief that the criminal justice
system may act against them whether or not
they commit crimes. Thus, protection of the in
nocent from police harassment may itself deter
crime, and harassment of the innocent by the
criminal justice system may encourage crime.
The latter result is used to hypothesize a partial
explanation of the ethnic demographics of the
U.S. prison population that is superior to the
conventional argument that cnminals are invet
erate risk takers. This explanation is generaliz-

able to cases where members of a particular so
cial group perceive themselves to be unfairly
treated by law enforcement agents.
The criminal justice system is considered to
help control crime because the likelihood of be
ing apprehended and punished deters persons
from committing crimes. Additionally, by the
apprehension, conviction, and punishment of
persons who have committed crimes, the sys
tem incapacitates and, with any luck, rehabili
tates criminals. Only deterrence, and not inca
pacitation or rehabilitation, is examined in this
article.
One side effect of the criminal justice system
is the potential for harassment, apprehension,

r
3-·_)

R. DACEY and K. S. GALLANT

and punishment of persons who have not com
mitted crimes, or at least have not committed
the crimes for which they are being investi
gated, apprehended, or charged. A simple ratio
nal actor model, an extension of the traditional
economic model of Becker (1968, 1995), estab
lishes the following result: For the majority of
individuals, a belief that the likelihood of ha
rassment is not reasonably lower than the likeli
hood of proper punishment encourages the
commission of crimes.
DECISION ANALYSIS A.l'-l"D ATTITUDE
TOWARD RISK
The analysis presented here is an extension
and refinement of the rational actor model em
ployed in the economic and game-theoretic
analyses of the decision to commit a crime. The
present analysis extends these analyses of crime
by including a more contemporary treatment of
attitude toward risk and the costs imposed on
nonparticipants in crime by the criminal justice
system. 1
The rational actor model characterizes ratio
nal behavior as svstematic
behavior �£0\·emed bv
.
the optimization of expected utility, itself determined by an individual's evaluation of the pay
offs and the likelihoods of the payoffs. and the
individual" s attitude toward risk. (On the ratio
nal actor model see Bernoulli. 1738; von Neu
m,mn. and Morgenstern, 1947; Savage. 1954;
Fishburn. 1970: and Jeffrey 1983. On attitude
toward risk see Bernoulli, 1738; Pratt. 1964;
and Arrow. 1965.) The modem account of the
rational actor model has been greatly informed
by careful observations of revealed risk atti
tudes (Fishburn. 1977; Fishburn and Kochen
berger. 1979; Battalio. Kagel, and MacDonald,
1985; Battalio, Kagel. and Jiranyakul, 1990.)2
The present analysis employs the modem ac
count of the rational actor model to provide a
refined and extended version of the traditional
economic analysis of crime (Becker, 1968, 1995).
The discussion presented here is kept consistent
with the traditional analysis for two reasons.
First, the traditional analysis serves as the foun
dation for much of the work in the law and eco
nomics literature. Second, the results of the tra-

-

ditional analysis provide a justification for the
contemporary get-tough-on-crime policies of
the federal and various state and local govern
ments in the United States.
The treatment of attitude toward risk is the
fundamental refinement of the traditional analy
sis adopted here. There are three relevant atti
tudes toward risk: (1) an individual is risk
averse if, and only if, the individual's utility
function is increasing at a decreasing rate; (2)
an individual is risk preferring if, and only if,
the individual's utility function is increasing at
an increasing rate; and (3) an individual is risk
averse/risk preferring if, and only if, the indi
vidual is risk averse over gains and risk prefer
ring over losses. Risk aversion is generally
viewed as the essence of middle-class normalcy,
while risk preference is viewed as an abnormality.
Risk aversion and risk preferring behavior
are regularly seen together, and various at
tempts have been made to explain their joint ap
pearance (Battalio, Kagel. and Jiranyakul, 1990:
Battalio, Kagel, and MacDonald, 1985; Cam
erer, 1989; Fishburn, 1977: Fishburn and Kochen
berger, 1979; Friedman and Savage, 1948). Ob
servations of revealed attitude toward risk show
that the majority of individuals are risk averse/
risk preferring; that the utility valuation of no
change in wealth is zero; and that the utility
function is more steeply sloped over losses than
over gains (Battalio, Kagel, and Jiranyakul.
1990; Battalio, Kagel, and MacDonald, 1985;
Fishburn and Kochenberger. 1979).
The modern work on risk also shows that
wealth serves as a parameter in the utility func
tion, and that the utility function can be viewed
as a two-dimensional cross-section of a three
dimensional surface. For example, a two-piece
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that
exhibits constant absolute risk aversion and
constant absolute risk preference is of the gen
eral form:
-BtJ.w

) for � w :2: 0

BtJ.w

) for 6 w � 0

U ( � w) = A ( 1 - e

= -a ( 1 - e

where A and a are slope parameters, B is the de
gree of risk version/risk preference, 6.w is
change in wealth, a > A > 0, and B > 0.

Crime Control

will �ield a gain. If caught and punished, the de
cision maker believes there will be a loss,
greater than the gain, imposed by the criminal
justice system. The individual assesses the
probability, given that the crime is committed,
of being punished. The decision not to commit
-I ·
-BD.w
U (6.w) = w A ( 1 - e
) for6.w � 0
the crime does not carry any gain, but may have
-1
B6.w
some costs imposed by the criminal justice sys
= -w a(l-e
) for6.w�0
tem. For example, an innocent person may be
Th.is surface is displayed in Figure 2. Note the ef stopped for investigation, detained, arrested,
fect of increasing wealth in Figure 2-the S-shaped and perhaps even convicted. The cost thus
utility function, which is a cross-section of the borne is called the harassment cost. The indi
surface, flattens as wealth increases.
vidual assesses the size and the probability of
incurring the harassment costs. 3 In a society
with diYided legislative, judicial, and executive
powers. the value of the fine is primarily set by
THE CRIME DECISION PROBLEM
the decision maker's perception of the law as
The crime decision problem consists of the set down in statutes and by the courts. The val
choice between engaging in a particular crimi ues of the harassment cost and the probabilities
nal act and not engaging in the act. The decision of being punished and being harassed are pri
is made on the basis of the individual's percep marily set by the decision maker" s perception of
tion of the particular crime and the existing lav.· enforcement policies and practices. 4
Consistent with the rational actor model, the
criminal justice system at the time of the deci
sion. The decision maker believes that the crime indiYidual chooses between the two acts--com-

This function is an S-shaped utility function
and is displayed in Figure 1.
The related von Neumann-Morgenstern util
ity surface, as a function of change in wealth,
-6.w, and wealth, w, is of the general form:

U(.0.w)

1

o
5

-10

-5

5

10

D.W

Figure 1. Graph of the Constant Absolute Risk A version/Risk Preference von Neumann-Morgen
stern Utility Function (A = 10, a = 20, B = 0.1).
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Figure 2. Graph of the Constant Absolute Risk A version/Risk Preference von Neumann-Morgen
stern Utility Surface (A = 10, a = 20. B = 0.1).
mitting and not committing the crime-by ap
plying the utility function to the possible out
comes of the acts, assigning probabilities to the
possible states of affairs, and determining the
probability weighted utility, called the expected
utility, of each act. The act with the greater ex
pected utility is the preferred act. To avoid trivi
alities, the present analysis is based on the
three-part assumption that the gain is positive.
the fine is greater than the gain, and the gain
less the fine is more negative than the harass
ment cost. The first two assumptions avoid situ
ations where crime does not pay and where

crime always pays: the last is merely the as
sumption that the criminal justice system is suf
ficiently accurate to impose. on average, greater
costs on criminals who get caught in its web
than on noncriminals. The analysis begins with
the presumption that the police are more likely
to properly intercept the guilty than to improp
erly intercept the innocent. 5
The crime decision problem is presented in
Table 1. The parameters are as follows-g is
the gain from the crime. f is the fine, c is the
harassment cost. p is the probability of rightful
punishment, and q is the probability of wrongful

TABLE 1
PAYOFF TABLE FOR THE CRIME DECISION PROBLEM

Punished or harassed
Not punished or not harassed

Payoff
If Crime Is
Committed

Probability of
Punishment

g-f
g

p
1 -p

Payoff
If Crime Is
Not Committed

-c
0

Probability of
Harassment
q
1 - q
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harassment. As noted, to avoid trivialities it is as
sumed thatf > g > 0, g-f < -c, and p > q. 6
The expected utility of committing the crime is:
EU[crime]

= pU(g-f)+(l-p)U(g),

and the expected utility of not committing the
crime is
EU[no crime] = qU(- c) + ( I - q) U(O),

where EU is the individual's expected utility
function and U(O) = 0. The individual prefers
committing the crime to not committing the
crime if. and only if:
EU[crime] > EU[no crime].
For an individual deterred from crime, the
difference between EU(no crime) and EU(crime)
is positive. The difference. denoted by D, is:
D = £U(no crime)-£U(crime)
= q u ( -c) - [p u ( g - f) + (1 - p) u ( g) ] .
The difference D is a crude measure of deter
rence because only two values of D are of inter
est: D > 0 and D < 0. Deterrence is maintained
for the individual only if D > 0 and is lost if D <
0. A change in one or more of the parameters.
that is. one or more g.f. c, p, or q, such that Dis
decreased. reduces deterrence because, as
noted. if continued until D < 0, such a change
will make participation in the criminal activity
the preferred act.
THE PlJN1SHMENT-DETERRENCE
TRADEOFF
The analysis presented here addresses one
basic question-does a strategy for increasing
the punishment of the guilty, f, increase deter
rence if it has the side effect of increasing the
level of harassment. c, imposed on those inno
cently caught up in the criminal justice system?
The answer to this question depends upon the
individual's attitude toward risk. The answer is
positive for risk averse and risk neutral persons.
and positive for risk averse/risk preferring per
sons as long as the probability of punishment, p.
is reasonably larger than the probability of ha
rassment, q. The answer. however, is negative

--

for risk averse/risk preferring persons if q is
close top.
The derivation of this result is straightfor
ward. The response of D to small and equal in
creases inf and c is given by the total differen
tial of D, dD. where
dD =

aD df+ an d c
cJJ

ac

= pU'(g-f)df-qU'( -c)dc,
and
cJD

cJJ

and

cJD
cJ c

are the partial derivatives of D with respect to f
and c, respectively. For a risk averse person,
U'(g - J) > U'(-c) because g - f < -c and U
is increasing at a decreasing rate. For a risk neu
tral individual, U'(g - f) = U'(-c). If p > q,
then dD is positive for a risk averse or risk neu
tral person. and the answer to the question is
positive. Contrariwise, for a risk preferring or a
risk averse/risk preferring person. U' (g - f) <
U'(-c), becauseg - J< -c < 0. and Uis in
creasing at an increasing rate over losses. Ifp is
reasonably larger than q, that is. if
U'(-c)
p
->----.
U
q
'(g-f).

then dD is positive, and the answer to the ques
tion is positive. Contrariwise. if q is close to p,
that is, if
p
U'(-c)
q < U'(g-f)'
then dD is negative, and the answer to the ques
tion is negative.7
The foregoing results warrant the following
claims. A policy of increasingly severe punish
ment of both the guilty and the innocent should
be a successful deterrent for those individuals,.
regardless of their attitudes toward risk, who ·
perceive the likelihood of punishment to be rea
sonably greater than the likelihood of harass
ment. Such a policy, however, will not be a suc
cessful deterrent for individuals who are risk
preferring or risk averse/risk preferring if they
perceive that the likelihood of harassment is
close to or greater than the likelihood of punish-
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ment. Note that the deterrent effect of increasingly severe punishment and harassment depends upon both the decision maker's attitude
coward risk and his or her perception of the likelihoods of punishment and harassment. Finally,
note that the foregoing analysis concerns only
the individual's movement toward committing
the crime. The individual chooses to commit the
crime if and only if D < 0, that is, if and only if.

tionately many members of minorities are risk
preferring over gains. (See, generally, Horney
and Marshall, 1992; Katz, 1991; Keane, Gilli,
and Hagan, 1989; Rand, 1992; Sherman, 1990;
U .S. Department of Justice, 1991; Williams and
Hawkins, 1986; Yu and Liska, 1993; Zimring
and Hawkins, 1973.)
The analysis advanced here presents the theoretical basis for a possibly superior (partial)
explanation of the demographics of the Ameri!
U( a) - U(-c)
can prison population. The explanation profp
q
O
.
-<~----fered here makes two simple presumptions.
q U(g)-U(g-f)
First, it is presumed that minority populations
have the same distribution of attirudes toward
Because
risk as the general population. Second, it is pre1
-U(o)>U(o)
sumed
that many minority individuals see themq O
0
selves as regular recipients of harassment, and
thereby perceive the probability of harassment
and
as close to, or even greater than. the probability
U(g- f) < U(-c ),
of rightful punishment. 9 This perception, and
the right-hand side of this inequality does nm: not some odd concentration of a rare attitude tohave a unique relationship co unity. Therefore. q ward risk. explains some. but not all, of the disneed not exceed p in order for committing the proportionate number of African American, Native American, and Latino prisoners in the U.S.
crime to be the preferred act.
penal system.
~ore that a claim is not made here that the
foregoing argument explains the whole of U.S.
RISK A TTITL'DE. HARASSMENT, AND
U.S . PRISON DEMOGRAPHICS
prison demographics. The literarure on the
causes of crime offers many potential causes,
The policy implications of the foregoing including poverty, opporcunity. and risk preferanalysis are straightforward. iuiy policy that in- ence. Members of minorities are disproportioncreases the severity of both the punishment of ately well represented among the poor, and they
the guilty and the harassment of the innocent. may have greater opporcunities for crime. It is
such as a war on crime. may tend to induce not likely, however, that they disproportionately
criminal behavior among those who are risk possess a rare attitude toward risk. The foregoaverse/risk preferring and perceive similar like- ing argument, based only on the presumption
lihoods of being rightfully punished or wrong- that minority individuals perceive a probability
fully harassed. The traditional economic analy- of harassment that is close to the probability of
sis of crime explains criminal activity by ' punishment, thus provides a superior explanapositing that most criminals are inveterate risk tion of some of the disproportionate minority
takes, that is. habirually risk preferring over representation in the U.S. prison system.
both loses and gains. 8 This explanation, although consistent with the analysis presented
here , has two glaring weaknesses. First, risk
ASPECTS OF FAIR.J.'iESS IN
preference over gains is rare (Fishburn and
CRilvIIN AL JUSTICE
Kochenberger. 1979) and criminal activity is
In an ideal society both q and c would be
not. Second. because a disproportionate number
of criminals in the U.S . prison system come very close to zero. In such a society, a law abidfro~ minority groups. the traditional explana- ing citizen would have a very low likelihood of
tion requires the presumption that dispropor- contact with the police or the legal system, and

--
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any contact that did occur would be at most a
minor inconvenience. This property of an ideal
society is one of the many facets of the notion
of fairness.
Most accounts of societal fairness are related
to wealth or income distribution. Bueno de
Mesquita and Cohen !1995) provides a game
theoretic model of criminal choice in which
fairness is introduced as wealth redistribution.
Specifically, the goYernmem is fair (or trust
worthy) if it imposes ..policies that promote op
..
portunities for the citizens. and it is unfair (or
untrustworthy) if it imposes "·policies that shift
resources to the goYernmem to be used as the
..
government sees fit (Bueno de Mesquita and
Cohen, 1995:494). Similariy. Young (1994) pro
vides an extensive formal treatment of fairness
as equity. On this ,·iew. a society is fair if "the
division of jointly produced goods [is made in a
way that the] society considers ro be appropriate
to the need, status. and contribution of its vari
ous members" (Youn£:. 1994:3 ).
The notion of fairness employed in the
present article has a muc:1 more limited scope
and focuses on the implementation of the proce
dures. rules, and laws of the legal system. In
this view, the legal system is fair to an individ
ual facing the crime decision problem only if
the probability of punishment, p, is reasonabiy
larger than the probability of harassment, q, and
the harassment cost. c. is close to zero. The le
gal system is unfair if q is dose top, or c is rea
sonably larger than zero. or both.
The results deri\·ed above can be restated in
terms of the (limited) notion of fairness. If the
legal system is unfair in the strong form of the
sense employed here (i.e .. if q is close top and c
is greater than zeroJ. then the individual moves
toward and ultimately chooses the criminal act.
Given the general perception that the legal sys
tem is unfair, in the sense used here, particularly
to African Americans. �ative Americans, and
Latinos, it is not surprising that members of
these minorities are disproportionately well rep
resented in the American penal system.
The notion of fairness as equitable wealth
distribution can be accounted for here by con
sidering different wealth levels of the decision
maker. The effect of wealth on the S-shaped
utility function was detailed above-the utility

--

surface flattens as wealth increases. Thus, those
individuals who are treated unfairly with re
spect to wealth distribution will have more ec
centric utility functions than those who are
treated fairly. A formal analysis of this effect is
beyond the scope of the present articl�. Note,
howeYer. that because an S-shaped utility func
tion is more steeply sloped on the loss side, the
effect of greater eccentricity is to give greater
weight to the risk preferring segment of the util
ity function. Thus, in general, unfairness with
respect to wealth will lead ro greater levels of
criminal activity in the present model. In partic
ular, it is easy to show that for an individual fac
ing giYen values of the parameters g,f, c, p, and
q, it is not possible to have crime preferred to no
crime at a high wealth level and no crime pre
f erred to crime at a low wealth level.
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NOTES
1. On the economic analysis of rhe crime decision see.
panicularly. Becker (1968. 1995'1 and. generally, Ehrlich
and Becker (1972), Ehrlich (1973). Block and Reineke
(19751. and Posner (1980). On rhe game-theoretic analysis
see Bueno de Mesquita and Cohen ( 19951. The traditional
economic analysis. panicularly Becker ( 1968), considers al
tematiYe risk attitudes. but does not consider either the risk
averseirisk preferring attitude or harassment. The Bueno de
Mesquita-Cohen (1995) analysis assumes that the decision
maker is risk neutral. and also does not consider harass
ment. The former point is clear from the calculation of the
expected utility fo r a criminal (Bueno de Mesquita and Co
hen. 1995:497). This calculation is linear in payoffs and
thereby presumes a linear (i.e.. risk neutral) utility function.
The latter point is made by Bueno de Mesquita and Cohen
as follows: "To keep our analysis as simple as possible at
this stage in our research, we assume that no one is mistak
enly arrested and convicted. and we assume that everyone
who is apprehended is guilty and conYicted" (Bueno de .
Mesquita and Cohen, 1995:497. footnote 8).
2. Parallel work is presented in Kahneman and Tversky
(I 979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Please note that
these studies present and refine Prospect Theory, which is
not consistent with the expected utility theory employed in
Becker (1968, 1995), Bueno de Mesquita and Cohen (1995).
and in the present anicle.
3. See Homey and Marshall (1992) for evidence that
among criminals these perceptions are formed in a manner
consistent with the rational actor model. See Yu and Liska
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( 1993) on the perception of the likelihood of punishment in
a study disaggregated by race.
4. The present analysis takes a middle path in defining
the costs of involvement with the criminal justice system.
and falls between the official criminal sanction (the sentence only) and all conceivable costs (such as humiliation in
the community). The latter are described as informal sanctions in an expanded concept of deterrence in Nagin and Paternoster (1991). Property forfeiture by the innocent. which
has become increasingly common in the United States. is
treated by Jensen and Gerber (1996).

5. There is one interesting case where the two probabilities are approximately equal-when law enforcement-citizen interactions involve random selection of persons for investigation. This would be the case where drunk driving is
detected primarily through randomly established roadblocks
or tax evasion is discovered primarily by randomly auditing
citizens' tax returns. There are a number of cases where the
probability of wrongful harassment is close to or greater
than the probability of punishment for members of certain
groups-when profiles, based on physical or physiological
traits related to race and ethnicity, are employed by law enforcement officials to make stops and to detain individuals.
6. Although each of g,J, and c is here viewed as a single
value. each is more accurately viewed as the moment of a
probability distribution. For example, a prospective criminal does not know the exact value to be gained from a
crime. such as the exact amount of money that can be stolen
from a bank. As a moment, the gain g is the expected value
of a random variable with possible values g 1• g: . .. . ,g" each
with probabilities P(g 1), P(g~) • ... , P(g"). Then g =
L ;g;P(g;) = g1P(g1) + 82P(g~) + · · · + gnP(gn) Similarly. f and c are moments with f = '5..j;F(f,) and c =
L;c;P(c). The treatment of g, f. and c as moments does not
markedly detract from the generality of the analysis because g ,J,
and c can be considered as independent random variables, and.

therefore, the lotteries (i.e., the full expansion of the terms) can
be replaced with the moments (Luce and Raiffa, 1967:23-31).
The payoff table for the general case where g, J, and c
can take on various values is shown in Table 2. In Table 2.

The expected utilities are then
EU(crime) = "I.iP(gi)U(gi)+Il-/(g;-Ji)U(gi-fj)
and
EU(nocrime) = P(O)U(O)--'f.iP(-c)U(-c).
7. An interesting limiting case. raised by a reviewer,
arises when the harassment payoff. -c, approaches the loss
from crime, g - f Considering just the payoffs, if g - f =
-c. then committing the crime dominates not committing
the crime. This is so because the payoffs to both acts are
equal given that the individual is punished and the payoff to
the former is greater than that to the latter, given that the individual is not punished. The probabilities, p and q, however, are not equal, and. therefore. simple dominance in
payoffs does not resolve the problem. If g - f = -c, then
the deterrence measure. D. becomes
D = [qU(-c)+(l-q)U(Ol]-[pU(-c)+(l-p)U(g)]

so that

D = (q-p)U(-c)-(l-p1l.·(g).
Because U(-c) < 0 and U<gi > 0. if pis close to unity. so
that (I - p)U(g) is close to zero. then D is positive and deterrence is maintained. If. howeYer. q is close to p. so that
(q - p)U(-c) is close to zero. then Dis negative and deterrence is lost. Thus, if g - f = -c. then deterrence is maintained only if p is large absolureiy and relative to q.

TABLE

2

PAYOFF TABLE FOR THE GENERAL CASE OF THE CRIME DECISION PRCBL!:M

Payoff
Crime Is
Committed

Probability of
Punishment

g, - t,
g, - f2

P(9, - t,)
P(9, - f2)

-c.
-Cz

P(-c1 )
P(-c2 )

9, - fn

P(9, - fn)
P(92 - f,)

-c.

P(-c1)

0

P(O)

If

Punished or harassed

Not punished or not harassed

Payoff

92 - t,
92 - f2

P(92 - f2)

92 - fn

P(92 - fn)

9m - f,
9m - f2

P(9m - f2)

9m - fn
g,

If Crime Is
Not Committed

Probability of
Harassment

P(9m - f,)

P(9m - fn)

92

P(g,)
P(g2)

QK

P(9K)
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8. Becker writes as follows:
It is easily shown that an increase in pi would reduce
the expected utility [of committing the crime], and thus
the number of offenses, more than an equal percentage
increase in fj if [individual j] has a preference for risk;
the increase infj would have the greater effect if he has
a\·ersion to risk: and they would have the same effect if
he is risk neutral. The widespread generalization that of
fenders are more deterred by the probability of convic
tion than by the punishment when convicted turns out to
imply in the expected-utility approach that offenders are
risk preferrers. at least in the relevant region of punish
ments. (Becker. 1968:178)
Becker recently reiterated this \'iew:
I believe that criminals actually like risk-they're
risk takers. not avoiders. What supports this belief? The
economic approach implies that. for a risk taker engaged
in crime. the certainty of punishment is more important
than the magnitude of the punishment when or if you are
convicted. (Becker, 1995:I 1)
The comparison of equal percentage changes in p and f
in the model employed here produces somewhat more so
phisticated results. It is easy to show that an increase in pre
duces the expected utility of crime by more than an equal
percentage change inf only if the rnlue off is already rea
sonably high. More specifically. for an individual with the
S-shaped utility function facing the crime decision problem
with c = 0. an increase in p has a greater deterrent effect
than an equal percentage change inf only iff > ft where ft is
determined by the equation
U'(g-f1) =

U( 0 )-U(o-f)
0

f

. l

.,

.

I

, Geometrically. this equation states that J; is determined so
that the chord from the point [g.U(g)] to the point [g /. Uc g - fi)] is tangent to the utility function at [g - fi,U(g / 1). l The widespread generalization that increasing p has a
greater deterrent effect than increasing f implies in the ex
pected utility approach, extended and refined via the S-shaped
utility function. that most potential offenders face crime de
cision problems where the le\'el of punishment is already
high (i.e., probiems wheref > J;J.
9. Yu and Liska (1993) pro\'ide a sample (from 26 U.S.
cities) that suggests that this perception by African Ameri
cans is, for assaults and rapes. well supported. They note
that ·'blacks contribute 76'ic of the robbery arrests and 76%
of the robberies; 65% of the assault arrests and 50% of the
assaults; and 73% of the rape arrests and 55% of the rapes"
! Yu and Liska, 1993:455-6. footnote 9). Hagedorn and Ma
con (1988) and Jankowski (1991) report anecdotal evidence
that minority individuals in gangs perceive themselves to be
harassed by the police.
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